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INTRODUCTION
New York State courts, like many other state and federal courts, have seen an increase in cases that pit lawyer versus client; where the lawyer wanted to proceed in one way and the client wanted to go in another direction. The resulting decisions, often inconsistent and irreconcilable, reflect the difficulties in navigating the lawyer-client relationship.
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals again waded directly into the muddy waters of attorney versus client decision-making. 2 On the face of it, the Court was deciding whether counsel needed his client's consent before telling the prosecutor that his client would not exercise his statutory right to testify in the Grand Jury. 3 However, lurking beneath the surface are the larger and related questions of who, between lawyer and client, has ultimate decision-making power, and what information lawyers must provide clients about their rights.
Marcus Hogan was arrested on Tuesday, May 24, 2005 for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Mr. Hogan was in his former girlfriend's apartment when police officers entered to execute a search warrant for the premises. 4 Officers testified that as they came into the apartment they saw Hogan running from the kitchen where, in open view, they discovered cocaine, baggies and a razor blade. 5 Hogan's former girlfriend, Hope Fisher, was also inside the apartment and she, too, was arrested.
Since Mr. Hogan did not live at the apartment or have any contraband on him when he was stopped by the police, the prosecution's case hinged on the so-called drug factory presumption. 6 New York law allows "a permissible presumption, under which the [fact-finder] may assume the requisite criminal possession simply because the defendant . . . is within a proximate degree of closeness to drugs found in plain view, under circumstances that evince the existence of a drug sale operation [ 8 However, on May 27, Mr. Hogan asked that his lawyer subpoena Ms. Fisher to testify on his behalf. 9 Apparently, almost from the moment of arrest, Ms. Fisher took full and sole responsibility for the drugs and related paraphernalia. 10 As a result, the preliminary hearing was adjourned until the following Wednesday, June 1, 2005. Nevertheless, at approximately 4:00 p.m. on Friday, May 27, the prosecution faxed notice to defense counsel of their intent to bypass the preliminary hearing and present the case to the Grand Jury on Tuesday, May 31 at 1:45 p.m. 11 The fax further instructed defense counsel to notify the prosecutor if his client wanted to testify in the Grand Jury.
Friday, May 27, 2005 was the beginning of Memorial Day weekend, 5 Id. at 782. 6 Id. 9 Id. 10 Id. at 439. On June 3, the prosecutor received a notarized letter from Ms. Fisher in which she assumed full responsibility for all the drugs and other items recovered from her apartment. Id. Fisher testified that "Marcus Hogan is not at all in any way possible responsible for the charges brought upon him . . . . Everything that was found . . . was mine and I accept full responsibility [.] " Id. at 579. Ms. Fisher eventually entered a plea of guilty to a reduced charge with a promise of a sentence of probation but only after she on the record disavowed part of the statement she made in her letter. Id. at 322-87. 11 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 782; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.80 (McKinney 1982) (providing that the defendant must be released from custody if the prosecution does not obtain an indictment or provide a preliminary hearing within 120 or 144 hours of arrest); Record on Appeal, supra note 7, at 527-28. [Vol. 20:14 and Hogan's defense counsel had left his office before the fax arrived. 12 He did not see the fax until Tuesday morning, May 31, the very day the prosecution was presenting the case to the Grand Jury. 13 Defense counsel immediately contacted the prosecutor and told her that his client was not going to testify.
14 The prosecutor went ahead with the Grand Jury presentation and Hogan was indicted for Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree and related charges. 15 Mr. Hogan first learned about the Grand Jury presentation and indictment the next day, June 1. 16 Hogan was arraigned on the indictment on June 21, 2005 . 17 On July 19, defense counsel filed an omnibus motion but did not address the adequacy and timeliness of the Grand Jury notice until he filed a supplemental motion on August 19, 2005 seeking to have the indictment dismissed and giving his client the opportunity to testify before the Grand Jury. 18 Defense counsel argued that he received late and inadequate notice of the Grand Jury presentation, thereby preventing his client from asserting his statutory right to testify. 19 The trial court focused on the requirement that motions to dismiss an indictment for failure to provide the accused the opportunity to testify must be brought within five days of arraignment and denied the motion as untimely. 20 The judge eventually granted Mr. Hogan's request for a new courtappointed lawyer. 21 A non-jury trial commenced on May 1, 2006 and ended two days later. 22 The judge found Mr. Hogan guilty of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree and associated charges, and 12 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 782. 13 Id. During oral argument in the Court of Appeals, Judge Eugene Pigott expressed concern with the prosecution sending a fax on a Friday afternoon prior to a holiday weekend, and seemed to question whether that provided sufficient statutorily required notice for the defendant to consider whether to exercise his right to testify in the Grand Jury. After noting the importance of the Grand Jury, he asked whether the timing of the notice was a "cheap shot" or some kind of "gamesmanship. 14 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 782. Defense counsel recalled telling the prosecutor that he "didn't see the benefit to it, only the harm." Id. 15 Id. 16 Record on Appeal, supra note 7, at 528. 17 Id. at 29. 18 Id. Throughout the entire proceedings, Mr. Hogan kept trying to refocus the issue. His argument was not just that the prosecutor's Grand Jury notice was defective, but also that the decision to testify should have been his, not defense counsel's, to make, or, if not, that defense counsel had an obligation to consult with him before telling the prosecutor that he would not testify.
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Put another way, Mr. Hogan was quite correctly framing the issue as a question of the allocation and attendant responsibilities of decision-making authority between lawyers and clients.
I. THE LAWYER AS DECISION MAKER
The Court of Appeals began its analysis in Hogan by adhering to the prevailing fundamental versus strategic decisions taxonomy. According to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Jones v. Barnes, only four of the myriad decisions made in the course of a criminal case are deemed sufficiently personal and fundamental for the accused to have ultimate decision-making authority: whether to plead guilty; whether to testify at trial; whether to have a jury or judge trial; and whether to appeal. 25 The Court hewed to the traditional view that only those so-called fundamental four decisions were reserved for the accused and all others were strategic and ceded to defense counsel. However, the Court did more than just hold that the decision whether to testify in the Grand Jury was strategic and for the lawyer to make. The Court declined to squarely address defense counsel's failure to consult with Hogan before deciding he would not testify, suggesting that since the lawyer is the ultimate decision maker he was not required to consult with his client about the decision. In other words, it was of no constitutional moment that Hogan had no input into the decision regarding his right to testify in the Grand Jury.
The Hogan Court also seemed to go out of its way to make clear that counsel had a constitutional duty to make strategic decisions even in the face of his client's express disapproval: "If defense counsel solely defers to a defendant, without exercising his or her professional judgment, on a decision that is 'for the attorney, not the accused, to make' because it is not fundamental, the defendant is deprived of 'the expert judgment of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him' or her [ made it clear that the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel requires lawyers to overrule their clients when there is disagreement over tactics.
Hogan seems to follow logically from People v. Colville, 27 a case decided by the Court just a few years earlier. Delroy Colville was charged with murder for stabbing and killing the 20-year-old victim on the third floor of a single room occupancy dwelling during an argument. 28 At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel informed the court that he had advised the defendant that Manslaughter in the First and Second Degrees should be charged to the jury as lesser-included offenses 29 because charging murder alone left the jury with "no leeway, no choice." 30 Counsel, accordingly, requested that Manslaughter in the First and Second Degrees be charged to the jury, but the court denied the request and stated it would allow counsel to address the issue again when the trial reconvened.
Defense counsel subsequently informed the court that, after discussing the issue with the defendant again, he had been advised that the defendant did not want the lesser-included offenses charged to the jury. Counsel, however, still believed, and still advised his client, that submitting the lesser included charges was the best way to proceed. After a brief recess, the court made clear for the record that the defendant no longer wanted lesser offenses included in the charge to the jury, and defense counsel reiterated that this was against his advice.
33 The jury was instructed to only consider the Murder charge and Colville was convicted.
34
On appeal, the question was initially framed around whether the decision about lesser included charges was for the accused or his lawyer to make. 35 However, New York's intermediate appellate court made short shrift of the issue by observing that if it was a fundamental decision then the defendant had been allowed to be the ultimate decision maker, and if it was a strategic decision then it was reasonable for the lawyer to have acceded to his client's request. 36 The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. 37 The Court determined that the decision whether to seek a jury instruction about lesser included offenses was a strategic one for the attorney to make, and that "[B]y deferring to defendant, the [trial] judge denied him the expert judgment of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him."
38
Taken together, Hogan and Colville show the Court's clear preference for vesting decision-making power in defense counsel. In Hogan, the defendant claimed that the decision to testify in the Grand Jury was his to make and that, at a minimum, he had to be consulted before his lawyer made any decision. 39 The Court disagreed on both counts: the Grand Jury decision is ultimately for the lawyer to make and the lawyer is not required to consult with the client before making that decision. 40 In Colville, the accused was consulted repeatedly, so the client's input was not the issue. Instead, the defendant claimed on appeal that the decision to submit lesser included offenses was for the lawyer, 41 not the accused, to make. In other words, he argued that his lawyer should have overridden his request, exercised independent professional judgment, and saved him from 32 Id. at 195-96. 33 43 Romero was convicted of Robbery in the First Degree and filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment because: (1) counsel failed to request that the jury be instructed on the affirmative defense to the charge of First Degree Robbery that the object displayed in the commission of the robbery was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or other serious physical injury 44 and (2) counsel failed to request the lesserincluded charge of Second Degree Robbery or consult with Romero before making that decision. 45 The Court dealt swiftly and perfunctorily with the question of counsel's decision not to request jury instructions regarding the affirmative defense to Robbery in the First Degree or to add the charge of Robbery in the Second Degree. 46 In the Court's view, the defense theory of misidentification made it reasonable for defense counsel to avoid asking for any instructions that might dilute the force of his argument that the defendant was not the person who committed the robbery.
But as in Hogan, the defendant in Romero also argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to even consult with him prior to making these crucial 42 Id. For a recent application of Colville, see People v. Lowery, 127 A.D.3d 1109 (2d Dep't 2015). In Lowery, the defendant was charged with robbery. Defense counsel advised the trial judge that he wanted to request a jury charge on the lesser-included offense of petit larceny but that the defendant opposed that request. The judge deferred to the defendant and did not submit the lesser-included offense of petit larceny to the jury. The appellate court, citing to Colville, reversed the defendant's conviction holding that the decision whether to seek a jury charge on a lesser-included offense is a matter of strategy and tactics which is "for the attorney, not the accused, to make." . Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude conviction of, robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime."
45 Romero, 2016 WL 3460372, at *4. 46 Id. at *8.
decisions. 47 In language strikingly similar to Hogan, the District Court held that:
Even if better practice would have been for trial counsel to discuss his decision not to request affirmative defense and "lesser included charge" instructions with Romero (assuming he did not), the New York Court of Appeals has held that the decision regarding whether or not to request a "lesser included charge" instruction is ultimately the attorney's, not the defendant's, to make. Thus, even if Romero had objected to trial counsel's decision not to pursue contradictory misidentification and "lesser included charge" strategies, trial counsel would have been obligated to pursue the strategy that he, in his own professional judgment, believed had the highest likelihood of success, notwithstanding Romero's disagreement.
48
In sum, while it has long been the case that strategic decisions are for the lawyer to make, it now seems clear that counsel is not required to even discuss those decisions with her clients. If, however she chooses to do so, and then discovers that her client disagrees with her decision, she must override the client and do what she thinks is best. 49 , the defendant appealed his conviction claiming that his right to confrontation had been violated. At trial, the defendant had asked that the jury hear a guilty plea allocution from a co-defendant. Defense counsel objected but the trial judge read the transcript which included statements incriminating Lee. The Court held that "[t]he decision to introduce evidence was not a fundamental decision reserved to defendant, but a strategic or tactical decision for his attorney[.] Thus, defendant was deprived of his right to counsel when the court admitted the evidence solely based on his own request, over his attorney's vigorous and consistent opposition [.] " Id. at 1137-38 (internal citations omitted). 50 The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), attempted to address the component parts of the Sixth Amendment's requirement of effective assistance of counsel. The Court set out a two-part test: to support a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's actions had a prejudicial impact on the result. Id. at 689-92. The decisions in Hogan, Colville, and Romero indicate that it is not objectively reasonable for a lawyer to defer to a client on a strategic decision about which they disagree. Of course, the actual decision made by defense counsel could still be subject to an evaluation of its objective reasonableness, but as the Court made clear in Strickland,
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II. THE CLIENT AS DECISION MAKER
Even as the Court is telling defense counsel to control the case and make the tactical decisions she deems best (even if in the face of the client's express disagreement), there is lurking along a parallel track another line of cases that suggest the opposite; that the lawyer can, or maybe even should, defer to the client's wishes even if she disagrees with the course of action the client desires or finds the defendant's choice to be devoid of any logic or merit.
In People v. Henriquez, the defendant, Michael Henriquez, approached a police officer and told him he had just killed his girlfriend. 51 Police officers went to Henriquez's apartment and found the victim dead from numerous gunshot wounds to the head. 52 Henriquez was taken to the precinct where he provided written and videotaped confessions. 53 He was subsequently charged with Murder in the Second Degree.
54
After jury selection, Henriquez's appointed lawyer informed the trial judge of a conflict he had with his client:
Your Honor, there is something I want to put on the record. The defendant advised me this morning . . . he is directing me not to cross-examine any witnesses, not to object to any line of questioning, not to call -to go even further, not to approach the bench, not to participate in any bench conferences or side bars, not to have any defense in this case, not to call any witnesses, not to sum up, not to do anything. He has indicated to me he just wants me to sit here and do nothing.
55
Defense counsel then asked to be relieved from representing Mr. Henriquez and requested that Henriquez represent himself. 56 Henriquez, however, stated, "I didn't ask to represent myself. You can't tell me I have to represent myself." 57 The trial judge affirmed Mr. Henriquez's statement and informed him that he did not have to self-represent and denied defense "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts . . . are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Id. at 690-91. 51 counsel's application to withdraw from the case.
58
The trial was filled with examples of defense counsel and the court deferring to the defendant on countless decisions and imbuing him with the power to control every aspect of the defense, including a multitude of strategic or tactical decisions. 59 During jury selection, when an issue arose concerning substitution of a juror, defense counsel informed the judge that the defendant would not permit him to provide any input to the court. 60 Just prior to the first witness being called to testify, the trial judge informed the defendant that he could always change his mind and "permit" his attorney to participate in the trial. 61 During the trial, defense counsel objected to the testimony of a proposed prosecution witness because that person had been seated in the court during the testimony of earlier witnesses. 62 Rather than rule on the objection, the court raised concerns that the objection was made without the defendant's permission. 63 Counsel thereupon conferred with the defendant and withdrew the objection. 64 To make it abundantly clear who he thought controlled the defense case, the court at one point flat out told the defendant, "Mr. Henriquez, I am respecting your right to restrict your attorney in the way he defends you." 65 The Court of Appeals upheld Henriquez's conviction, finding that he was not denied his right to a fair trial and that he waived his right to the effective assistance of counsel by refusing self-representation and then restricting his lawyer's participation. 66 Rather than engage in a critical discussion of the allocation of decision-making authority between lawyers and clients, Jones v. Barnes, the relevant ethical rules, and the objective reasonableness of counsel's behavior, the majority appears to have simply viewed the case as a malingering, obstreperous defendant who got his just desserts: "Defendant asserts that his constitutional right to a fair trial was 58 Id. at 213. 59 Respondent's Brief, supra note 54, at 7 (explaining that defendant instructed counsel not to make an opening statement, not to cross-examine any witnesses, not to call any witnesses, not to make a closing statement, and not to object to any line of questioning). 60 violated because the trial court and defense counsel respected his desire to refrain from presenting a defense." 67 While the Court writes of "respect" for the defendant, the opinion is devoid of any discussion of the thorny moral and ethical issues involved in the client autonomy versus lawyer paternalism aspect of the "who decides" debate. Rather, the decision reads more like the court's way of saying, "you made your bed and now you have to lie in it."
On the other hand, the lengthy dissent of Judge George Bundy Smith places the case entirely in the allocation-of-decision-making context: "The trial court and defense counsel did not adhere to the legal and professional standards regarding the allocation of decision-making authority between the accused and defense counsel." 68 The dissent's tone of incredulity and repulsion is very apparent:
As a consequence of the trial court's and defense counsel's compliance with defendant's instructions . . .
[d]efense counsel did not respond to the People's opening statement, did not make any objections, cross-examine the People's witnesses, make any oral motions at the close of the People's case, put on a case, make a closing statement or provide any input regarding proposed jury charges because defendant did not want him to. The trial court allowed defendant's instructions to control and allowed defense counsel not to do anything on defendant's behalf.
69
The dissent's logic is straightforward. The defendant made it clear that he did not wish to represent himself and that he wanted a lawyer. "As such, defendant had the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel," 70 and sitting idly by as your client goes down a path of selfdestruction cannot possibly be labeled as "effective" assistance. Judge Bundy Smith refers to counsel's "affirmative obligation" 71 to provide effective assistance. In other words, once Henriquez said he wanted a 67 Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 68 Id. at 217-18 (G.B. Smith, J., dissenting). 69 Id. at 222. The lawyer's failure to do anything calls to mind the remarks of defense attorney Brendan Sullivan when he was representing Oliver North in the Iran-Contra scandal in 1987. During the hearing in front of the Joint House-Senate Iran-Contra Committee, the Chair, Senator Daniel Inouye, admonished Sullivan for objecting to some of the questions put to his client and urged North to speak for himself. Sullivan famously responded, "Well, sir, I'm not a potted plant. I'm here as the lawyer. That's my job." Special to the New York Times, Iran-Contra Hearings; Note of Braggadocio Resounds at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/10/world/irancontra-hearings-note-of-braggadocio-resounds-at-hearing.html. 70 Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d at 225 (G.B. Smith, J., dissenting). 71 Id.
lawyer, that lawyer had a constitutional duty to act, to make the strategic decisions he thought were best even if his client consistently and openly disagreed with those decisions. The import of Judge Bundy Smith's reasoning should give pause to those lawyers who believe that the Henriquez trial was a travesty but consider themselves "client-centered" counselors who strive to vest their clients with autonomy and decision-making authority.
72 Judge Bundy Smith writes that the trial judge "mistakenly increased defendant's rights at trial [.] " 73 For support, he quotes Supreme Court Justice Harlan: "I believe a lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial even in the face of his client's incomprehension or even explicit disapproval."
74 Bundy Smith writes further that the majority's decision "grants defendant too much power over the trial," and suggests that if we go down this road it could "whittle away at the integrity of the trial process." 75 Perhaps not surprisingly, Michael Henriquez subsequently moved pro se for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. 76 counsel. . . . Once this fact was made known to the court and to . . . counsel, it should have been clear to them that acquiescing in Henriquez's demands that prevented his attorney from acting as an advocate at the trial proceedings, and exercising his independent professional judgment in the management of the defense was an error of constitutional magnitude. 78 But revealing the ambiguous and unsettled nature of these issues, District Court Judge Denise Cote, a former prosecutor, rejected Magistrate Judge Fox's recommendation as to ineffective assistance.
79 Judge Cote's opinion is couched in terms of the defendant's right to do as he pleases: "Given that a defendant may waive altogether the right to assistance at trial from an attorney, and can of course choose to plead guilty and forego the right to a trial altogether, it takes no great leap to conclude that a defendant also has the ultimate right to instruct his attorney to present no defense on his behalf." 80 As with the majority decision in the Court of Appeals, the opinion speaks of the defendant's rights, but is hardly about respect for autonomy. Rather, it reeks of disdain for the defendant daring to complain after he got what he wanted. 81 Although its facts are indeed unique, the Henriquez rationale has not proven to be sui generis. The suggestion continues to surface that allowing the accused to be the ultimate decision maker regarding tactics is somehow about respect for that defendant. The decision at issue in People v. Cruz was whether to pose a defense of complete innocence to Murder or to pursue defenses that might have led to a Manslaughter conviction. 82 Defense counsel deferred to the client's all-or-nothing defense and the appellate 78 Henriquez, 2007 BL 217379, at *14. 79 Henriquez, 2007 WL 844672, at *7. 80 Id. (emphasis added) ("[N]ot every failure to subject the prosecution's case to adversarial testing is a violation of the Sixth Amendment."). 81 Other jurisdictions have similarly held that a defendant cannot complain of ineffective assistance if counsel follows the client's even foolhardy request. In United States v. Wellington, 417 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2005), the defendant told his lawyer to stipulate to key facts and not to raise certain objections. Defense counsel told the court that "he did not necessarily agree with his client, but that defendant 'has given a lot of thought to this and I advised him, [and] he's the boss.'" Id. at 288. The Second Circuit observed that the strategy was "ill-advised and wholly ineffective," but there was no ineffective assistance since defense counsel followed the defendant's instructions. 84 During jury deliberations, Hurricane Sandy hit New York City and caused court to close. Several days later, the court contacted the jurors about continuing to serve and excused one juror who said he had to leave the country.
When trial resumed two days later, defense counsel objected to the discharge of the juror without her first having been consulted, 85 and informed the court that she told defendant "'a number of times that I do not think we should go forward with 11,' but defendant was 'extremely insistent,' was 'tired of this process,' and did 'not want to retry the case.'"
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The trial judge confirmed that that was what the defendant wished to do, had the defendant and counsel sign waivers of the right to a 12-person jury, and proceeded with eleven jurors.
The Appellate Division observed that the court should have given defense counsel an opportunity to be heard before excusing the juror, but held that the defendant waived his right to a 12-person jury. 87 While the court cited Henriquez for the proposition that the defendant "must accept the decision he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made,"
88 it inexplicably made no reference to Colville and the line of cases holding that defense counsel must override the client on strategic decisions on which they disagree. For that matter, it is astonishing that the Court of Appeals, in its decision in Colville giving awesome decision-making power to the lawyer, did not even mention Henriquez and its paean to respect for the defendant's right to chart his own defense.
The most current incarnation of the decision-making authority conundrum is People v. Clark. 89 The defendant's assigned counsel advised the court that he had discussed with the defendant the possibility of presenting defenses of extreme emotional disturbance and/or justification in addition to the misidentification defense favored by the defendant, but added: Even while it cited to Colville and recognized that matters of strategy, like whether to request lesser included offenses for the jury's consideration, are generally ceded to counsel, the Court stated that "a defendant unquestionably has the right to chart his own defense." 91 The Court further held that the decision to pursue a defense based solely on misidentification, and to affirmatively reject an alternate defense based on justification, involved a matter that was "personal" and "fundamental" to the defendant and "did not implicate a matter of trial strategy or tactics." 92 The Court reasoned that to require defense counsel in this case, over his client's objection, to undermine the defendant's assertion of innocence by the injection into the case of a factually and logically inconsistent defense would, under the circumstances presented, impermissibly compromise the defendant's personal rights. Therefore, there existed "a sound basis for leaving the choice of defense, whether affirmative or ordinary, with the defendant rather than his or her attorney." (1996) . In Petrovich, the trial court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which, if successful, would reduce the murder counts to manslaughter. Id. at 962. Defense counsel responded affirmatively but the defendant disagreed. Id. Defense counsel insisted that he, not the defendant, should decide what instructions to request, but the trial court declined to charge the extreme emotional disturbance defense. Id. at 963. The defendant was convicted of murder and appealed, arguing that the trial court should have acted in accordance with his counsel's wishes. Id. at 962. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that "the decision whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury falls to defendant" as it was more in the nature of a fundamental decision than one that implicated trial strategy or tactics. Id. at 963.
Appeals's ruling in Colville to the contrary. 94 First, the Court questioned whether granting counsel ultimate authority regarding which lesser-included offenses to request necessarily also gave counsel final say over which defenses to present. 95 In other words, it appears the Court was clinging to the idea that the decision at issue in Clark was distinguishable from that in Colville and was more appropriately deemed to be a fundamental decision for the accused to make. 96 Additionally, the Court noted that Clark's trial took place two years before Colville was decided and counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the law. 97 If anything is clear it is that the current state of the law is ambiguous. Lawyers representing clients in criminal cases are left with no comprehensible guidance about when they must defer to or override their clients' requests. 98 
III. CHARTING A PATH FORWARD
Michael Henriquez and Prince Clark certainly in hindsight needed to be saved from themselves. Their lawyers did as they were told and both defendants were convicted of Murder. To many, the lawyers' abdication of decision-making responsibility was at best, wrongheaded, and at worst, cowardly and deplorable. And yet the dissent in both cases, arguing forcefully that defense counsel was ineffective for acceding to the client's wishes, is also controversial.
Many lawyers for indigent defendants ascribe to a version of clientcentered lawyering that seeks to imbue clients with agency, authority and autonomy. 99 Those advocates fear that if lawyers exercise the tightfisted control over the case advocated in the Henriquez and Clark dissents, they are in effect subjugating their clients, overwhelmingly people of color, in much the same way as have a variety of governmental agencies. More specifically, Judge Bundy Smith's admonition that the trial judge "mistakenly increased defendant's rights" and "grant[ed] defendant too much power," conjures up concerns of paternalism and of lawyers running roughshod over their clients. 100 Contrast that language and the message it conveys with the equally blunt call for client autonomy from the dissent in Colville: "Because a defendant has the most to lose in a criminal proceeding (i.e., freedom), reason dictates that the defendant shall control his/her own destiny and have the ultimate authority regarding choices he/she makes (even if against the advice of counsel)." 101 On a very fundamental level, the defendant bears the consequences of a conviction; the defendant, not the lawyer, serves the jail or prison time imposed after conviction and faces a host of collateral consequences.
102
Calls for defense counsel to be the ultimate decision maker also seem at odds with the longstanding judicial expectation that the defendant at the time of sentencing (and when eligible for parole) will accept full responsibility for his or her actions. 103 Shouldn't it then follow that the accused has responsibility for his or her trial?
The "who decides" analysis must also factor into the equation what kind of defense counsel we are imagining. When a client disagrees with his privately retained counsel, he is free to hire another attorney to do his bidding. 104 The majority of criminal defendants, however, are unable to afford counsel. 105 In cases where counsel is appointed by the government, the client is not entitled to replace one lawyer with another, 106 A poor defendant has two preliminary choices -eschew a lawyer and opt for self-representation, 107 or accept his or her constitutional right to a government supplied lawyer. 108 Courts have made abundantly clear that there is no such thing as hybrid representation. 109 If, for example, the client files a motion that the lawyer declined to file, the court is under no obligation to read it because the accused has opted to have a lawyer. 110 As the New York Court of Appeals stated, a defendant who chooses to defend through counsel cannot, as of right, make motions, file a supplemental brief on appeal, sum up before a jury, "or otherwise participate personally in the proceedings [.] " 111 In other words, if the accused accepts what he or she is constitutionally entitled to, he cedes control over substantial and critical aspects of his defense.
There is also the well-documented seemingly intractable crisis in indigent defense characterized by lawyers with too many clients and too few resources.
112 How much attention can typical Public Defenders pay to counsel of one's own choice; while a defendant may not be forced to proceed to trial with an incompetent or unprepared counsel, the court has no obligation to appoint a lawyer outside the public defender's office simply because a defendant believes all lawyers from that office are incompetent."). 113 How should differences between lawyers and clients with respect to race, ethnicity, language, etc., affect who gets to make which decisions? 114 The well-documented lack of trust between indigent defendants and their lawyers is exacerbated by the institutional nature of the provision of defense lawyers for the poor -anyone in the defendants' shoes would question the loyalty of a lawyer supplied to them for free by the very government that is prosecuting them.
115
The decisions that vest power with defense counsel and mandate that she overrule her clients when they disagree elide the impact that will likely have on the attorney/client relationship going forward. While it is true that the Supreme Court decided that the accused has no right to a "meaningful relationship" with counsel, 116 that is not a reason to ignore the effect on the accused and on the quality of the representation that results from lawyers overruling their own clients.
It is hard to imagine being in prison and thinking every day that it would have turned out differently if only the lawyer did what I asked. But it is also hard to imagine being in prison and thinking every day that it would have turned out differently if only I listened to my lawyer. Is the lawyer ultimately just a mouthpiece? Isn't it too easy for defense lawyers to absolve themselves of difficult decisions by simply falling back on a mantra of, "Well, it was his choice," instead of accepting the heavy burden and responsibility of making crucial decisions? And if the adage is true that "[the] person who represents himself has a fool for a client," 117 then isn't giving the accused decision-making power just a variation on that theme? Is someone likely filled with anxiety, fear, frustration, anger and misery (and typically lacking in legal training) in the best position to make his or her best legal decisions? In many cases, the accused's current predicament is the result of bad choices he has made. Is it wise or "client-centered" for him to now be entrusted with decision-making authority of such importance? 118 Coming full circle to the most recent decision from New York's highest court − who should decide whether to testify in the Grand Jury? 119 If we adhere to the fundamental versus strategic decision dichotomy, why distinguish between testifying at trial (fundamental) and in the Grand Jury (strategic)? What about testifying at the sentencing phase of a capital case, 120 or at a competency, 121 parole violation, 122 or suppression hearing?
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The decision whether to testify at trial was not always deemed fundamental and for the accused to make. There is no right to testify in the explicit text of the Constitution. However, in Rock v. Arkansas 124 the Supreme Court found that the right to testify "has sources in several provisions of the Constitution[,]" 125 including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 126 Other courts observed that the right to testify is an inherent analog of the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled testimony.
127
Rock, however, did not address whether the decision to testify at trial was for the accused or counsel ultimately to make. The court in Wright v. Estelle 128 wrestled with that very question and in a per curiam decision held that defense counsel had ultimate decision-making authority. The court saw the decision as one about strategy and strongly believed that defense counsel was far better equipped to make the best choice for the client:
The question here is twofold: who is in a better position to judge trial strategy and who is in a better position to ensure the best interests of the defendant. This court's history is filled with the recognition of the value of an attorney. No one could seriously contend that a defendant is in a better position to dictate trial strategy than his attorney.
129
As for client autonomy, the court believed that defense counsel had a responsibility to protect the defendant from his bad choices:
An attorney is not necessarily ineffective if he determines not to she or he can waive); see also 129 Id. at 1073. The court expounded on its holding with much rhetorical flourish: "Trial attorneys are professional artisans working in a highly competitive arena that requires all the skills which education, training, and experience have given them. . . . A defendant has a right to necessary surgery, but he does not have the right to require the surgeon to perform an operation contrary to accepted medical practice. " Id. allow his client to testify, even though he should give great deference to a defendant's desire to testify, however, we are here concerned with constitutional requirements and there is no constitutional requirement that a court-appointed attorney must walk his client to the electric chair.
130
Judge Godbold's dissent was equally poetic and vigorous. He observed that many defendants might just believe that they have the capacity to persuade the jury, or that without regard to impact upon the jury, his desire to tell "his side" in a public forum may be of overriding importance to him. Indeed, in some circumstances the defendant, without regard to the risks, may wish to speak from the stand, over the head of judge and jury, to a larger audience.
131
Autonomy played a central part in Judge Godbold's analysis. Rather than grant defense counsel the power to override the client in the name of protecting the client's best interests, Judge Godbold wrote that the "wisdom or unwisdom of the defendant's choice does not diminish his right to make it. The lawyer's authority is vindicated when he advises his client."
132
The majority and dissenting opinions in Wright serve well to frame the issue. For the majority, the lawyer, with his or her special training and experience, is the better trial tactician and knows how to achieve the best result for the client. 133 For the dissent, the client's desire to testify, even if 130 Id. at 1073-74. 131 Id. at 1078 (Godbold, J., dissenting). Judge Godbold's view on the subject seems to be powerfully heartfelt: "Indeed, our history is replete with trials of defendants who faced the court, determined to speak before their fate was pronounced: Socrates, who condemned Athenian justice heedless of the cup of hemlock; Charles I, who challenged the jurisdiction of the Cromwellians over a divine monarch; Susan B. Anthony, who argued for the female ballot; and Sacco and Vanzetti, who revealed the flaws of their tribunal. To deny a defendant the right to tell his story from the stand dehumanizes the administration of justice. I cannot accept a decision that allows a jury to condemn to death or imprisonment a defendant who desires to speak, without ever having heard the sound of his voice." Id.
132 Id. at 1079. Even more pointedly, he wrote that the attorney's role was not to "muzzle" the client. Id. at 1078. 133 Courts have proffered other reasons besides lawyer expertise for vesting defense counsel with decision-making authority over virtually all decisions designated as strategic. Some courts focus on the adversarial system and the overarching concern for a fair trial. seemingly unwise, must be respected in the interests of personal dignity and autonomy.
Ultimately, Judge Godbold's position prevailed and every circuit that has since addressed the issue has deemed the right to testify at trial to be a fundamental, personal right that only the accused may waive. 134 As the 11th Circuit held in United States v. Teague, "When an individual stands accused of criminal conduct, the choice to tell his side of the story has ramifications far beyond the mere immediate goal of obtaining an acquittal. It is, after all, the defendant's day in court." 135 Why don't those same principles and rationales apply to the accused's Grand Jury testimony? Why is there nary a word in the Court of Appeals's opinion in Hogan of the client autonomy issues hotly debated regarding the right to testify at trial? The decision simply notes that the right to testify in the Grand Jury is statutory (as opposed to the constitutional right to testify at trial), 136 parrots the usual language about fundamental versus strategic decisions, 137 and then states that a lawyer's expertise is required because of the potential negative consequences that flow from the defendant's Grand Jury testimony. ) . However, the ruling giving the accused the power to decide whether to testify was not unanimous: "I understand and agree that a defendant must personally decide how he will plead to the charges against him, whether he will waive trial by jury, and whether he will appeal. But these decisions are not about trial tactics; they are materially different. These decisions determine whether there is to be a fight and who will judge the fight's outcome. But, once the client decides that there is to be a fight and that he wishes to be represented by a lawyer, I agree with those judges who say that defense counsel need not defer to the client's desires on how the fight is to be waged." Id. at 1536 (Edmondson, J., concurring). Judge Edmondson also drew a distinction between the requirements of the ethical rules that vest with the client the right to make this decision and the requirements of effective assistance of counsel, noting that ethical guidelines might serve other purposes rather than obtaining an acquittal. However, although well-established, the fundamental versus strategic distinction articulated in Jones v. Barnes is devoid of any meaningful underlying rationale, 139 and no court has yet taken the opportunity to acknowledge that truth and devise a more valid and useful way to distinguish the myriad decisions in a criminal case.
The time is ripe for such an analysis. Although the Jones v. Barnes "fundamental four" Supreme Court pronouncement took root long ago, there has been mounting dissatisfaction with, and criticism of, the distinction between fundamental and strategic decisions. Section 4-5.2(a) of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, titled "Control and Direction of the Case," used to provide that "decisions which are to be made by the accused . . . are" essentially the same ones spelled out in Jones. 140 However, when the Standards were revised in 1993, Section 4-5.2(a) replaced the word "are" with the word "include" in order to "make it clear that this list is not deemed to be exclusive." 141 Trial courts have been increasingly perplexed about how to allocate decision-making authority between lawyers and clients in capital cases (e.g., the accused wants to testify in favor of a death sentence against the wishes of defense counsel, or directs defense counsel not to present any mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the case); 142 1985) . In 2014, a man on death row wrote to the Supreme Court asking that the justices reject the petition for certiorari that he said was filed without his knowledge or consent by the Executive Director of the Atlantic Center for Capital Representation. The Court denied the writ, directed defense counsel to file a response to the letter, and referred the allegations to the local disciplinary health issues (e.g., a defendant with a history of mental illness is found competent to stand trial and then objects to his counsel's interposition of a mental status defense); 143 and cases with charges of terrorism (e.g., where the attorney wants to present a "traditional" criminal defense and the accused wants to assert a "political" defense). 144 Left with no decipherable, coherent guidance, trial judges muddle through as best they can leading to different rules and outcomes in different courts.
In one of the only examples of a Supreme Court Justice reflecting about which decisions are fundamental or strategic, Justice Scalia captured the extant lack of clarity: "I would not adopt the tactical-vs.-fundamental approach, which is vague and derives from nothing more substantial than this Court's say-so. . . . What makes a right tactical? . . . Whether a right is 'fundamental' is equally mysterious." 145 Justice Scalia would instead "adopt the rule that, as a constitutional matter, all waivable rights (except, of course, the right to counsel) can be waived by counsel." 146 So back again to the decision whether to testify in the Grand Jury. Maybe the defendant knows his chances at trial are bleak and he wants to take a chance with the greater number of Grand versus Petit jurors. 147 Maybe he wants his day in court and knows that precious few cases actually go to a jury trial so this is likely his only chance. 148 Maybe, just as was imagined with some trial testimony, he wishes to talk beyond the Grand Jurors and reach a wider, if not higher, audience.
149
Courts that grant defense counsel ultimate decision-making authority over strategic choices assume that lawyers know best because they can rely on their legal training and experience. But is that actually true for the decision whether to testify in the Grand Jury? Many defense attorneys simply never put any clients to testify in the Grand Jury. 150 Can it be properly deemed a strategic decision if it is a blanket rule with no individual case-by-case analysis? 151 Is it true that defense counsel knows best with respect to all strategic decisions? What about which jurors to keep or challenge peremptorily? 152 What special training or knowledge does defense counsel have in this regard that merits her having the final say? Courts have rarely carefully analyzed specific decisions to justify whether the lawyer really is best qualified to make a particular purportedly strategic decision.
However, while one could argue about whether the right to testify in the Grand Jury is fundamental or strategic and who should make the final call, perhaps the more contentious underlying issue has to do with the court's dispensing with the need for the lawyer to consult with the client (let alone obtain his consent). Recall that in Hogan, defense counsel did not discuss the issue with his client before he called the prosecutor and said the defendant would not testify. 153 While the court said that discussing the decision with the client might be the "better practice," it did not require it. . 149 See Mayson, supra note 101; see also INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 101. 150 See Simmons, supra note 137, at 37 n.173 (citations omitted) ("Unfortunately not even the District Attorney's offices themselves keep track of how many defendants actually testify -only one out of fifty-four counties surveyed reported that they compiled data on how often defendants gave notice to testify or actually testified. . . . Forty-one of the fiftyfour D.A.'s offices estimated that fewer than 10% of the incarcerated defendants who gave notice that they wished to testify actually did so."). 151 In her dissent in Hogan, Judge Jenny Rivera questioned how defense counsel could have made a strategic decision that his client would not testify without having even consulted with his client about his potential Grand Jury testimony. obtaining the client's consent to the lawyer's preferred choice. Defense counsel discussed with the defendant the strategy of conceding guilt at the trial stage of the capital case so as to present as strong and coherent a position as possible at the sentencing phase. 156 Nixon never gave his express consent but counsel conceded his guilt in his opening statement to the jury. sleeve' offering gratuitous suggestions." 162 However, the commentary does provide that certain decisions "can be anticipated sufficiently so that counsel can ordinarily consult with the client concerning them." 163 While the Court in Nixon held that counsel could carry out strategic decisions without the client's express agreement, the decision left unresolved the question of whether counsel could proceed on her preferred path even in the face of the client's unequivocal disagreement. This is where the decision-making rubber hits the road. Assume the lawyer has consulted with the client. Assume further, that the lawyer ascribes to the belief that she is obligated to offer advice and to urge the client to accept her advice. 164 Assume, however, that the client cannot be persuaded and explicitly disagrees with the choice urged by the attorney. Now what should counsel do?
According to the New York Court of Appeals, the question is not what counsel should do but rather what counsel must do -she must overrule her client and go down the path she believes is best. 165 To someone unfamiliar with criminal defense, it likely seems strange that the accused does not get to make the final decision or even have the right to be consulted. But to Public Defenders it might actually be a relief to finally receive the Court's imprimatur on their longstanding practice.
As the majority pointed out in Hogan, testifying in the Grand Jury is fraught with significant potential negative consequences, such as providing the prosecution with discovery, admissions and impeachment material. 166 Those fears may well be overplayed given that so few cases actually do go to trial, but for most lawyers discretion is the better part of valor when it comes to clients testifying in the Grand Jury.
Still, the possible costs only explain the reasons why defense lawyers believe their clients should not testify in the Grand Jury, not why so many lawyers decline to inform, let alone consult, their clients about their right to testify in the first place.
Consider the typical situation where the lawyer meets her client within twenty-four hours of his arrest. She has a limited amount of time to conduct her interview, and in that time needs to learn the essential facts of the case and factors to persuade the judge to release her client on his own recognizance. Now add to the mix a discussion of the right to testify in the Grand Jury. Complicating that discussion of the right to testify is the lawyer's conviction that it will be not be exercised. For many lawyers, the idea of telling their client they have a right, but in the next breath telling them they should waive it, is too likely to lead to confusion, greater distrust, and conflict. Put simply, many defense lawyers, like defense counsel in Hogan, don't "see the benefit to [testifying in the Grand Jury], only the harm," 167 and therefore decide it is a conversation best left unsaid. The fundamental decision about whether the accused should testify at trial often reveals similar motivations on the part of defense counsel. Defense lawyers for the most part also tend not to want their clients to testify at trial. 168 Some people just don't make good, compelling, persuasive witnesses, are easily intimidated, are subject to impeachment, or have a prior record. There is also the fear that by testifying the defendant somehow relieves the prosecution of its burden of proof. But, again, these considerations only go to defense counsels' reasons for preferring that their clients do not testify. What, if anything, do they tell their clients about this fundamental constitutional right in cases where they firmly believe it should not be exercised?
The trial judge is not obligated to inform the accused of his right to testify. 169 Often, when the prosecution announces the end of its case-in- 167 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 782. 168 See Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 852 (2008) ("Although the exact numbers vary by jurisdiction, studies reveal that up to half of all criminal defendants who proceed to trial elect not to testify on their own behalf, and that this percentage has been increasing since at least the early twentieth century."). 169 Only a few states require a trial judge to apprise the defendant of his right to testify and hold an on-the-record colloquy regarding any waiver of that right. See Timothy P. chief, the trial judge simply asks defense counsel if she is "putting on a case" or has "any witnesses." If counsel answers in the negative, that ends the inquiry. 170 However, while the court is under no obligation to advise the accused about his right to testify, must defense counsel so inform her client? In People v. Windley, 171 at a post-conviction hearing regarding the defendant's claim that he was not advised of his right to testify at trial, his trial lawyer was asked if he discussed with his client whether he was going to testify. Counsel replied: "I'm not sure of that. . . . My philosophical bend, as a result of long discussions and pondering over that issue . . . [is] that you never put a defendant on the stand. Period." 172 When he was then asked whether that was his strategy in not putting this particular client on the stand, he replied, "In every case." 173 While counsel in Windley may have been expressing the attitude and practice of many defense lawyers, the courts have a different view. In People v. Cosby 174 the court reiterated that there is no obligation on the part of the trial judge to inquire about the defendant's apparent decision not to testify, but held that defense counsel must advise her client of the right to testify and, further, must tell her client that the decision, the ultimate authority, rests with him. 175 This judicial pronouncement likely caused consternation among many Public Defenders who fear that if they tell their client about his right to testify, and further explain that he is the ultimate us. We walked out of the Grand Jury room and waited to hear the inevitable news of an indictment from the prosecutor. Several minutes later he came out and mumbled, "They voted no true bill. Your guy is being released." Our guy? I'm sure he didn't feel like he was in any way shape or form "our guy."
We waited for our client to be released but he must have gone out through a different door because we never saw him again. Did we do the right thing? I don't know, but the Court of Appeals certainly doesn't think so. 
